## BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD 1 STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 GARRY A. WILL, 3 Appellant, PCHB NO. 05-023 4 v. 5 ORDER GRANTING STATE OF WASHINGTON, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, 6 Respondent. 7 8 9 This matter comes before the Board on Respondent Department of Ecology's (Ecology) 10 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Board members Bill Clarke, Chair, and William H. 11 Lynch, member, deliberated on the motion. Administrative Law Judge Cassandra Noble 12 presided for the Board. The Board has reviewed and considered the pleadings and other motion 13 papers contained in the Board record, including the following: 14 1. Ecology's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 15 2. Declaration of Sarah Bendersky in Support of Respondent's Motion for Partial 16 Summary Judgment and exhibits 1, 2 and 3: 3. Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary 17 Judgment and appendices A and B; 18 4. Declaration of Garry Will, August 9, 2005; 19 5. Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and 20 21

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6. Declaration of Bob Barwin in Support of Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Reply to Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, August 18, 2005 and Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

The parties submitted this matter to the Board for its consideration on the written record without oral argument. Accordingly, based on its review of the foregoing documents, the Board enters the following order:

## **BACKGROUND**

Appellant challenges Ecology's decisions on two water right change applications issued in January 2005. The Appellant claims that Ecology's approval of Application Nos. CS4-ADJ38VOL5-GP42 and G4-10221P and for the change of two water rights improperly subjects the changes to all senior water rights. He denies that the wells involved were either in continuity with or interfered with any senior water rights. Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Ecology has moved for partial summary judgment on issues 1(a) and 1(b), arguing that this Board has no jurisdiction over a Stipulation and Agreed Order entered into by the parties in 1984 in an earlier case before this Board, PCHB 82-205. Ecology argues that, because it lacks jurisdiction, the Board may not require Ecology to adhere to the terms of the 1984 agreement with regard to the identification of surveys, investigations and studies appropriate to develop sufficient information on the groundwater-surface water interaction at the site.

This case follows settlement of a previous dispute over twenty years ago. Will and Ecology entered into a Stipulation and Agreed Order, signed on October 3, 1984, settling PCHB

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB NO. 05-023 82-205. At that time, Ecology agreed to issue a preliminary permit in the amount of 300 gallons per minute upon the Appellant's water rights application and also that it would provide Appellant with data then held by the Department in its files, including information gathered after a pump test on the elevation of well collars and stream beds. Appellant claims that Ecology did not meet its obligations as specified in the Stipulation and, because of that, he was denied the opportunity to acquire adequate water rights. With regard to the change application that is the subject of this appeal, the Appellant asserts that Ecology was required to comply with what he asserts are its unfulfilled contractual commitments to him prior to issuing the current change application approval. He states that Ecology should have issued a preliminary permit for 300 gallons/minute of new water right and worked with him to develop necessary information on the ground water/surface water interaction at the site.

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After the settlement, Appellant did not apply for the changes in his water rights until 1993, nine years after his agreement with Ecology. Ecology states that, had Appellant submitted his application in 1984 (when the agreement was made), Ecology would have issued a preliminary permit and gathered data on the ground water - surface water interaction at Appellant's site, as was Ecology's practice at the time. But by 1993, Ecology had already gathered sufficient knowledge of the interactions between ground water and surface water interactions in the Okanogan Valley to meet its responsibility to make the four required statutory findings prior to its permit decision on this application. "Combining what Ecology knew about stream and ground water interactions in the Chelan and Okanogan areas with water right case law relating to hydraulic continuity that evolved through the late 1980s and early 1990s, a ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB NO. 05-023

preliminary permit would not have been necessary in 1993 when [the Appellant] applied for a permit to use the well." Declaration of Barwin, p. 2. Ecology approved the Appellant's change application, but subjected his water right to all senior rights.

The Appellant objects to Ecology's subjugations of his change of place of withdrawal to senior rights and regulation of his water right as a junior right, which could result in reduction and/or complete curtailment of his withdrawal. Notice of Appeal, p. 2 (filed Feb. 18, 2005). Appellant claims that, as had been promised in connection with settlement of his prior case, Ecology should have issued him a preliminary permit for the requested 300 gallons per minute and cooperated with him in the development and review of information on the ground water/surface water interaction at the withdrawal sites. Appellant asserts that his ground water wells would not be in continuity with, or interfere with, any claimed senior water rights. He states that Ecology should have provided him with the opportunity to review and question any information it developed pursuant to survey investigation studies and reports that Ecology deemed to be sufficient information on ground water surface water interaction at his site. He questions whether there has, in fact, been any information developed that relates to his site. See Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 5.

## **ANALYSIS**

Summary judgment is a procedure available to avoid unnecessary trials on formal issues that cannot be factually supported and could not lead to, or result in, a favorable outcome to the opposing party. Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977). Summary judgment is designed to eliminate trial if only questions of law remain for resolution. Summary judgment is ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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1	appropriate when the only controversy involves the meaning of statutes, and neither party
2	contests the facts relevant to a legal determination. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Security State Bank, 59
3	Wn.App. 161, 164, 796 P.2d 443 (1990), rev. denied, 117 Wn.2d 1004 (1991).
4	The party moving for summary judgment must show there are no genuine issues of
5	material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Magula v. Benton
6	Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 182; 930 P.2d 307 (1997). A material fact in a
7	summary judgment proceeding is one that will affect the outcome under the governing law.
8	Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wn.2d 451, 456, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992). In a summary judgment, all facts
9	and reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party as they have been
10	in this case. Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 146 Wn.2d 291, 300, 45 P.3d 1068 (2002).
11	The issues in this case are as follows:
12	Whether the PCHB has jurisdiction over the Stipulation and Agreed Order entered into by the parties in PCHB No. 82-205?
13	(a) If the Board has jurisdiction over that Stipulation and Agreed Order,
14	is Ecology required to adhere to that order and to issue a preliminary permit in the amount of 300 gpm in connection with Application
15	CG4-10221 (Permit No. G4-10221P)?
16	(b) If the Board has jurisdiction over that stipulation and Agreed Order, is Ecology required to adhere to that order and to identify surveys,
17	investigations and studies appropriate to "develop sufficient information on the groundwater-surface water interaction of the
18	site"?
19	2. Whether Ecology made a determination regarding ground water-surface water interaction when it reviewed the requested changes to permit No. G4-10221P?
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21	3. Whether Ecology has the authority, when approving the requested changes to permit No. G4-10221P, to condition that the changes be subject to existing rights?

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his current application.

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Ecology moved for partial summary judgment on issues 1(a) and (b). Ecology argues that the authority in RCW 43.21B.110 and WAC 371-08-315(2) provides no jurisdiction over a stipulation and agreed order where the Board dismissed the relevant appeal years earlier, and, particularly, no jurisdiction over what is essentially a contract dispute.

The Appellant argues that, because the previous agreement with Ecology was not fulfilled, Ecology's failure to complete the specific actions set forth in the Stipulation is relevant to his challenge of Ecology's decision as to the current water right applications. Thus, he argues, the Board does have jurisdiction to decide whether Ecology complied with the Stipulation and whether, under these circumstances, Ecology's decision on the current application was lawful. Appellant describes the central issue in this case as follows: "...the question is whether Ecology is required to adhere to its contract with [the Appellant] pursuant to which it agreed to issue a preliminary permit for the right to withdraw an additional 300 gallons per minute of a new water right and to work with [Appellant] in developing sufficient information on the ground water surface water interaction at the site before issuing the order on appeal." Appellant's Response Opposing Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2. Appellant ties his contractual agreement with Ecology in settlement of the earlier case to the application that resulted in the current appeal. He asserts that, by making the agreement, Ecology acknowledged that it did not have sufficient information to support its denial of Appellant's original application. He also questions whether Ecology had the necessary information when it made the decision on

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With regard to the scope of the Board's jurisdiction, RCW 43.21B.110 lists the kinds of
decisions that can be appealed to this Board. They include certain decisions of Ecology, local
conservation districts, air pollution control boards or authorities, and local health departments.
The Board's authority does not include claims and disputes between individuals over contracts.
In 1993, the Washington Supreme Court reiterated the principle that agencies are strictly bound
by their statutory authority:

The resolution of this case turns on fundamental rule of administrative law—an agency may only do that which it is authorized to do by the Legislature. *In re Puget Sound Pilots Ass'n*, 63 Wash.2d 142, 146 n.3, 385 P.2d 711 (1963); *Neah Bay Chamber of Commerce v. Department of Fisheries*, 119 Wash.2d 464, 469, 832 P.2d 1310 (1992). The Administrative Procedure Act of 1988 (APA), RCW 34.05, specifically provides that a court "shall grant relief from an agency order...if it determines that ...[t]he order is outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency conferred by any provision of law". RCW 34.05.570(3)(b).

Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology et al., 122 Wn.2d 219, 226, 858 P.2d 232 (1993).

Although the issues in PCHB 82-205 concerned Ecology's reasons for denial (interference with existing and claimed senior water rights), that case was dismissed at the parties' request. Therefore, the Board no longer has jurisdiction over the issues in that case. If a claim is based on actions outside the review authority of this Board, it must be dismissed as a matter of law. The Board lacks the authority to decide the Appellant's contract claim against Ecology and therefore issues 1(a) and (b) must be dismissed to the extent that they present contract questions.

However, Issues 1(a) and (b) do also suggest factual questions that could have relevance to the resolution of the remaining issues. Issue 1(a) concerns Ecology's non-issuance of a

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preliminary permit in the amount of 300 gpm. Ecology's statement that it had sufficient
information and did not need to issue a preliminary permit is a fact that remains disputed. Issue
1(b) concerns the sufficiency of the information on the groundwater-surface water interaction of
the site. Issue 2 relates to whether Ecology made a determination regarding ground water-
surface water interaction, and Issue 3 concerns the subjugation of the Appellant's water rights to
existing rights. Ecology has moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Board lacks
jurisdiction to consider whether Ecology failed to perform its contractual obligations. The Board
agrees that it lacks jurisdiction over contract disputes, even when they arise in the context of a
case before the Pollution Control Hearings Board. However, the factual questions raised within
Issues 1(a) and (b) should survive the granting of partial summary judgment as they may have
relevance to the resolution of Issues 2 and 3. Summary Judgment is appropriate where there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307 (1977).
[CITE] A material fact in a summary judgment proceeding is one that will affect the outcome
under the governing law. Eriks v. Denver, 64 Wn.App. 128, 822 P.2d 1257 (1992). [CITE] The
trier of fact must construe the evidence and consider the material facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weatherbee v.
Gustafson, 64 Wn.App. 128, 822 P.2d 1257 (1992). [CITE] In connection with his response to
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Appellant submitted a declaration and documents
that concern the events and communications relating to the earlier application. These factual
matters may also have possible relevance to the current application. Viewing this evidence in the ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB NO. 05-023
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1	light most favorable to the Appellant, the Board concludes that, although summary judgment is
2	appropriate as to the legal issue of its jurisdiction over the question of whether the contract was
3	fulfilled, that determination should not preclude Appellant from producing evidence about the
4	bases for and information supporting Ecology's decision on the current application. To the
5	extent that such evidence addresses Issues 2 and 3, it should be allowed.
6	ORDER
7	In accordance with the analysis above, Respondent Department of Ecology's Motion for
8	Partial Summary Judgment as to issues 1, 1(a) and 1(b) is granted, but Appellant is not precluded
9	by this Judgment from presenting evidence that is relevant to the factual bases for Ecology's
10	decision on Appellant's application that is the subject of this appeal.
11	DONE this 30 <sup>th</sup> day of September 2005.
12	POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD
13	BILL CLARKE, CHAIR
14	WILLIAM H. LYNCH, MEMBER
15	CASSANDRA NOBLE Administrative Appeals Judge, Presiding
16	Administrative Appears Judge, I residing
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21	ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB NO. 05-023 9